Metaphorical Interpretations of the Neurotic Paradox by Weaver, Mark J.
Utah State University 
DigitalCommons@USU 
All Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies 
5-1981 
Metaphorical Interpretations of the Neurotic Paradox 
Mark J. Weaver 
Utah State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd 
 Part of the Psychology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Weaver, Mark J., "Metaphorical Interpretations of the Neurotic Paradox" (1981). All Graduate Theses and 
Dissertations. 5895. 
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd/5895 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Graduate Studies at DigitalCommons@USU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in All Graduate Theses and 
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@USU. For more information, please 
contact digitalcommons@usu.edu. 
Approved: 
METAPHORICAL INTERPRETATIONS F THE NEUROTIC PARADOX 
by 
Mark J. Weaver 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree 
of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
in 
Psycho 1 ogy 




This is a theoretical/philosophical paper which is in-
tended to bring to the reader's attention an emerging 
literature and discussion which holds potentially pro-
ductive consequences for the understanding of man. This 
thesis does not offer completed fonnulations or empirical 
groundings. The purpose is to create a basis for dialogue. 
This paper will initially specify a current conflict 
in psychology around the different metaphors used to define 
the image of man. A theoretical/philosophical basis for 
viewing the process of generating models of man and his 
behavior as essentially "metaphorical" is then presented. 
A specific category of human behavior known as the neurotic 
paradox (henceforth abbreviated NP) is defined and a review 
of literature on the root metaphorical interpretations of 
the NP is discussed. The prominent extant models of human 
behavior reviewed in this discussion are those based on the 
metaphors Spirit, Disease, Machine, and Seed. The limita-
tions of each model will be discussed with regard to that 
model's adequacy to provide understanding of the four basic 
defining characteristics of the NP. This section constitutes 
the main body of the thesis. This evaluative discussion of 
the theoretical/philosophical inadequacies of each model is 
intended to bring to light the process and strategies (both 
explicit and implicit) which have evolved in the interpre-
tation of the image of man. 
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Metaphorical Interpretations of the Neurotic Paradox 
Problem 
Psychology is in a crisis. It is a conflict which has 
existed for some time and seems no closer to solution. One 
cause of the conflict is the harsh debates between behavior-
ism, Freudianism, and humanism-existentialism. Abraham Maslow 
calls these the three "forces" in psychology (1962, p. 9). 
The charges and counter charges are not frivolous. They 
are valid, significant and logical. They require answers 
which are difficult to achieve. 
Another cause of the conflict in psychology is that each 
of the three major "forces 11 has been shown to generate 
severe internal inconsistencies. These will be discussed 
in detail later. Briefly though, behaviorism, through its 
particularly narrow scientism, has reduced away such human 
characteristics as soul, consciousness, particularly self-
consciousness, the self, mind and will, among others. 
The paradox, to which this reductionism leads, is that it 
i s difficult for the behaviorist to maintain that there 
is a psychologist to have a psychology. Freudianisrn also 
has developed internal problems. It has been demonstrated, 
for instance, th.at one such problem is that Freud's constructs 
cannot be translated into scientific language and therefore, 
are untestable (see Bandura & Walters, 1963; Berkowitz, 1970; 
Singer, 1965; Silvennan, 1976). This is true in spite of 
Freud's strong contention that his theory is scientific. 
It has been shown additionally, by Thomas Szasz (1961) 
and others, that Freud's "mental illness" postulate is not 
empirical. No physical disease or trauma has been discovered. 
The humanist-existentialist "force" admits that 11scientism 11 
has become a problem in the field of psychology. Therefore, 
they prefer to take man as the image of man. But they have 
been unable to establish an epistemology which can furnish 
an understanding of the self-reflexive paradox encountered 
when one takes this approach, or any of the other approaches 
for that matter. The problem stems from the paradox involved 
in self-knowledge, that is, when man is both subject and 
object to himself. This paradox is a reality which must 
not be ignored if we hope to understand man. 
Philosophers of science have found a way to assert that 
paradox is not a serious problem in the physical sciences. 
Whitehead and Russell's theory of logical types reduced 
the problem of paradoxes to "sort-crossing" errors (1962, 
p. 37). P.,ny paradox, they hold, can be solved if it is 
analyzed correctly into its components and these are correctly 
allocated to their proper domains or levels. But in psycho-
logy, the subject-object paradox cannot be so easily res.olve.d. 
For instance, the behaviorists, who take the position of 
the natural sciences most strongly, have been unsuccessful 
in avoiding the self-referring paradox. B.F. Skinner (1971} 
has given us the most popular reductive definition of psy-
chology. He says it is the study of behavior. But R.D. 
Laing points out, 11The other person I s· behavior is an 
experience of mine. My behavior is an experience of the 
other." (_Laing, 1967, p. 17). In other words, the study 
of behavior is behavior and, therefore, the psychologist 
remains in the class which he studies. So, we cannot ignore 
the issue of the image of man because it is paradoxical. 
11The crucial category, for psychology, 11 wrote Rollo May, 
11is the self in relation to itself. 11 {_1967, p. 192). 
Still another cause of the conflict in psychology is the 
inadequate theoretical development and technical progress 
made by psycho 1 ogy as the II science of man. 11 After one 
hundred years of labor, even th.e 11scientific standing 11 
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of psychology is uncertain (Robinson, 1979, p. 5}. Research 
in psychology lacks consensus and overall guiding theory 
(_Jordan, 1968). Severa 1 things emerge as one thinks about 
and experiences the conflict in psycho 1 ogy. First, it has 
been, and continues to be, largely an epistemological issue. 
11When man is the subject, the proper understanding of science 
leads unmistakably to the science of understanding," is the 
interesting way Floyd Matson states this issue (1976, p. 
247). Modern psychology was founded with the motive to be 
a science. However, the philosophy of science which has 
been followed has become an issue itself. The reductive, 
positivistic, mechanistic, summative or additive, linear 
and categorical assumptions of science, each or in combina-
tions, create problems when applied to man in his attempt to 
understand himself. The reductive effort did away with 
spirit, soul, self, personality, mind, consciousness 
(especially self-consciousness), will, and original or 
creative thinking. And what did psychology gain in exchange 
for what it gave up? Psychology acauired a methodoloqy 
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and a hope. The method, which was essentially an epistemolo-
gical assumption, has been responsible for the reductive 
effort. The hope was founded upon the productivity shown 
by the natural sciences. This productiveness ~as not been 
forthcoming in psychology (Jordan, 1968). 
Second, going behind th.e more obvious debates and frus-
trations in psychology, Joseph Rychlak states, ·11At heart it 
is the imaae of man which is at issue in psychology's inter-
nal conflict, let us make no mistake about that. 11 (1968, 
p. 2) ,, An image of man, then, as I understand and use the 
concept, is a complete or whole picture of man. Following 
Rychlak's logic it is the mechanistic image of man assumed 
by the behaviorists, the sickness or illness image of the 
Freudians, and the seed or actor image of the humanist-exis-
tentialists which forms the deeper issue in psychology. 
The act of embracing one of the many alternative images 
of man and the implied social order is not primarily a 
scientific exercise. As Matson has stated: 
(it is) ... an existential and moral 
task: a challenge to each human being to 
forsake the passive posture of acquies-
cence before immutable cosmic law, so 
long imposed upon us by religion and 
science, and to assume the role of self-
creator--the maker of cultures and 
shaker of foundations--which is no 
1 anger forbidden by the refonned 
science of nature and is boldly encouraged 
by the revitalized science of man. 
(1976, pp. 12-13} 
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The attitude of this thesis is not meant to be one of 
simple critical analysis and exclusion. Indeed, the paradigms 
treated in the text may not be wholly discarded on the basis 
of any analysis. Exclusion is not the goal of this paper. 
It will be maintained that new and progressive meaning may be 
found within the. existing models when viewed through the 
perspective outlined in this thesis. As Thomas Kuhn ob-
served: 
Confronted with anomaly or with crisis, 
scientists take a different attitude 
toward existing paradigms, and tne na-
ture of their research changes accord-
ingly. (Kuhn, 1970, p. 90) 
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It is this change in attitude which I aim toward, and I do 
this by presenting a view of the theoretical/philosophical 
implications which subtly underly the different images or 
metaphors for the understanding of human behavior as they 
attempt to explain the specific category of Behavior known 
as the neurotic paradox. While the case may at times appear 
overstated, it is presented with a gracious respect for the 
meaning these paradigms carry in their approximations of 
the understanding of human behavior. Before proceeding, 
however, it will be helpful to briefly review the position 
being taken here about the process of asserting different 
metaphors for the understanding of the image of man. 
Conceptual Framework 
Much of the content and fonn of this thesis relies on 
the following definitions: 
Metaphor - A similarity of relations resulting in 
enhanced meaning through the j1J.xtaposition of two (or more} 
images, fantasies, ideas, concepts, events or things where 
the person becomes aware, to some degree, of the relationships 
generated by this dialectic combinatorial activity. The 
metaphorizing process enables a person to interpret 
11unknown11 phenomena i'n terms of 11known11 phenomena. ( For 
a full discussion of metaphor see Turbayne, 1962; Ricoeur, 
1975.) An example of a metaphor currently employed by a 
native American culture is the assertion that the moon1 s 
shape is like that of a bowl-like basket which changes its 
orientation in the sky to appear as it does. Another meta-
phor would be the interpretation of the brain as computer. 
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Model - An explicated metaphor. A model is a delimited 
set of relations. It may be physical, pictoral, formal, 
or verbal. The model of the moon metaphor is the basket. 
A more complicated model is that of the computer, with 
multitudinous functions, memory capacities, and infinite 
associational pathways to explain the workings of the brain. 
Myth - An expanded or amp 1 i fi ed metaphor. It is a set 
of extended relations to express or establish meaning of 
large scope. Truth, in an absolute sense, is not the pri-
mary issue in the use of this term. The emphasis is upon 
meaningful relations. Myths usually entail relations of the 
past, present and future in establishing meaning. An exampie 
of a myth would be an Indian belief system that god places 
his basket in the sky as the moon and occasionally shows his 
displeasure by removing it from view (lunar eclipse). Often, 
involved and emotionally ·intense rituals surround the myths 
of all cultures. 
Paradox - 11 ••• a contradiction that follows correct 
deductions from consistent premisis." (Watzlawick, 
Beavin, & Jackson, 1967, p. 188). In this paper it refers 
to relations which are correctly deduced (according to implicit 
or explicit rules from a ge.neric and speci'fied s·et of relations 
but which are contradictory. I use the term paradox in a 
somewhat qualified manner here. There are, in the literature 
of philosophy, accounts· of great pa rado:xes encountered by men. 
The intended use pres:ently does not co foci de with the cl as-
sica l meaning of logical paradox, nor does it refer to what 
logicians have (for a long time) been referring to as a 
"reducti o ad absurdum. 11 
Probably, Quine1 s (1966) description of antinomy comes 
closest to what is mearit here by the term paradox. 11An 
antinomy produces a self-contradiction by accepted ways of 
reasoning. 11 (Quine, 1966, p. 7) . He furthers this distinc-
tion by comparing antinomy to falsidical paradox, which 
necessarily includes a fallacy in the proof. A falsidical 
paradox connotes a "surprise" in meaning, which disappears 
when the underlying fallacy is solved. An antinomy, though, 
carries with it a "surprise" which may be accorrmodated only 
be repudiating part of our conceptual heritage. It is 
t~is function precisely which distinguishes the meaning of 
paradox assumed here. 
.... antimony (paradox) estab-
lishes that some tacit and trusted 
pattern of reasoning must be made 
explicit and be henceforward avoided 
or revised. (Quine, 1966, p. 13) 
The "tacit and trusted pattern of reasoning" corresponds 
with "premise" as used by Watzlawick in his definition 
cited above. 
It is with the above qualifications that the te-nn 
paradox i s implemented in this discussion . 
The creation and utilization of symbols is regarded by 
most as a uniquely human process (Cassirer, 1946; Klee & 
Schrickel, 1963; Langer, 1942; Maddi, 1970; White, 1949). 
The implementation of these symbols (or metaphors) often 
takes the form of cognitive metaphorizing. Take, for in-
stance, the following line of thought as an example of this 
intellectual process: 
If you program the environment effec-
tively, human behavior can be seen as 
mechanically responding to antecedent 
and consequent stimuli in an under-
standable and predictable fashion. 
Therefore, man is like a machine. 
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Note the assumptions which are interjected in this metaphor 
about behavior th-rough the 1 anguage ( behavi ori sti c in this 
example) employed by the metaphorizer. Referring back to 
the definition of metaphor above, machines with their 
structures and functions constitute the "known" phenomena in 
this metaphor, human behavior the "unknown." 
Meaning and meaningfulness are contextual and relational. 
"We understand something by referring to something we already 
know.'' (Sch.liermacher quoted in Palmer, 1969, p. 87). 
Meaning is thus defined as the perception of relations; 
relations made possible by the dialectical interaction of 
different elements or frames of reference in our envfron-
ment. Meaning is merely the name given to different kinds 
of relationships recognized in the process of dialectical 
interaction. 
An important observation about this process is that there 
is an irreducible difference between the world and our 
experience of it. Th.at is, human beings living in a "real 
world" do not operate directly or immediately upon that 
world, but rather construct a model, or representation of 
their experience that functions to generate and guide their 
behavior. Our representation of the world determines to a 
large degree what our experience of the world will be, how 
we will perceive the world, and what choices we will see 
available to us as we live in the world. 
It must be remembered that the object of the 
world if ideas as a whole is not the portrayal 
of reality--this would be an utterly impos-
sible task--but rather to provide us with 
an instrument for finding our way about more 
easily in the world. (Vaihinger, 1924, p. 15) 
The position being taken here is based on the assumption 
that even though the model is not an accurate portrayal 
of reality, it does, however, represent some similarity to 
what is real. 
A map (model) is. not the territory it 
represents but, if correct, it ~as a 
similar structure to the territory, 
which accounts for its usefu 1 ness. 11 
(Korzybski, 1933, pp. 59-60) 
Following these premises, it is not surpdsing that 
no two human beings. have exactly the same experiences; 
therefore, each of us may create a different model of the 
world we share and come to live in a different 11reality . 11 
(_See W. V. Quine's philosophical discussion of radical 
translation as a basis for the possibility of differences 
between the conceptual schemes of people, Word and Object, 
Chapter 2, 1960.) If we learn to view another person's 
behavior (thoughts, feelings, acts) in the context of the 
choices generated by th.eir particular model, then we may 
see them not as sick, crazy, or bad. Rather, they may 
be seen as making the best choices they are aware of, the 
best choice available to them in their model of the world. 1 
Wh.tle this. leads into a currently busy area of inquiry 
and research relative to the application of th.ese ideas. to 
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1This observation has. also been made by Bandler and 
Grinder. See their book The Structure of Magic, for a 
similar discussion. (Bandler & Grinder, 1975, Vol. I, pp. 1-4) 
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psychotherapy, the focus here is on the implicatfons for 
theorizers in metaphorizing about human behavior out of their 
experiential models of reality. The ideas of Freud, for 
instance, as one who theorized about the etiology of aberrant 
behavior , may be seen in this light. The observation has 
been made by many that the importance and centrality of 
sex in his model of neurosis may be associated with the 
extreme sexual repression he witnessed in his day. The 
myth (expanded, amplified metaphor) evolving from his 
work that sex plays such a pervasive role in neuroses has 
survived to the present, despite the claims to the contrary 
from current professionals. 
The conviction that human beings possess this novel 
capacity to manipulate symbols--to metaphorize--rests in 
the writings of some contemporary language theorists which 
suggest that language is essentially metaphorical in its 
nature and development (Campbell, 1975; Frentz, 1974). 
Suzanne Langer has suggested that "a metaphor is the law of 
growth of every semantic . not a development, but a 
principle" (1942, p. 119). In her extended discussion of 
language she observes that, 
Language is a vast repository of 
"faded metaphors," i.e. words ori-
ginally used in a metaphoric sense 
which have not acquired the ab-
stract relational meaning they first 
metaphorically suggested ... 
metaphor is the force that makes 
language essentially relational, 
intellectual, forever showing up 
new abstractable forms of reality." 
(Langer, 1942, p. 115)2 
This theory that language is essentially metaphorical 
is, in turn, grounded in the school of neurophysiology which 
assumes that symbolization is an inherent function of the 
nervous system, that the nervous system does not return 
direct impressions of the external world, but indirect 
symbolic representations (Gordon, 1961, p. 111}. This 
theory further maintains that the rudimentary symbolization 
process of the nervous system is elaborated on higher and 
higher levels, culminating in the cortex of the brain. 3 
Thus, when this argument is extended, language is asserted 
to have its roots in metaphor and through metaphor in the 
rich, symbol-generating nervous system. 
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The position being taken here, then, is that the process 
of metaphorizing is fundamentally a mental principle (in-
herent in language and grounded in the nervous system) and 
2For a further di.scussion of the evolution of words via 
metaphoric extension, see Barfield, 1926. 
3Maddi has developed his theory of personality under 
the assumption that th.e human needs to symbolize, imagine, 
and judge fn order to fee 1 sat1'sfied and avoid frustration 
because that is the nature of his organism (Maddi, 1970). 
In addition, there is some research (Reisen, 1961) indicating 
that the use of neural structures is necessary in fnfancy 
if they are to develop normally. 
is essential in creating meaning from experience and in 
constructing behavior-directing models. 
The use of metaphors in conceptual functioning as well 
as theoretical activity has been favorably argued from a 
general philosophical standpoi nt by Cassirer (1953-1957). 
Mehrabian (1968) presents a discussion on the use of basic 
metaphors and examples of their use in personali"ty theory. 
While much has been written about the use of metaphor within 
many disciplines, a review of what has been the history and 
development of this work goes well beyond the scope of this 
paper. What is appropriate to mention are some of the 
dangers around the use of metaphor. 4 
The power of metaphor has been emphasized by Pepper 
(1942) in his discussion of ''root metaphors" (pp. 239-40). 
For instance, in the work of Kurt Lewin, the network that 
interrelates words like field, vector, phase-space, tension, 
force, boundary, fluidity, etc., is a metaphorical under-
standing of perception which pervasively colors his theory. 
The more powerful metaphors serve to organize pieces into 
paradigms. Black {_1962), in his article "Models and Meta-
phors11 (cited in Ri coeur, 1975, p. 243) points out two 
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4For a comprehensive. annotated bibliograph.y and history 
of metaphor, see Sh_ibles, 1971. An excellent scholastic work 
on metaphor may be found in Paul Ricoeur 1 s book The Rule of 
Metaphor which. takes a multidisciplinary look at the creation 
of meaning in language (1975). 
powerful characteristics of these metaphors: their 
"radical" and "systematic" aspects.) Idealistic empiri-
cism holds that one need only to subject his theories and 
hypotheses to empirical scrutiny and then test his obser-
vations against statistical probability to verify their 
usefulness in describing reality, there is much more than 
meets the eye. The e.xperimenter 1 s framing of the research 
question, his perceptions, and his interpretations of the 
'
1raw11 data are all subject to the metaphorical bias he holds 
in reference to his work. In agreement with Pepper (.1942} 
it is suggested here that a metaphor or analogy (Simon & 
Newell, 1963) typically determines the kind of theory 
(i.e. categories, as~umptions, and hypotheses ) which under-
lies observation and description. 
A related danger concomitant with the process of meta-
phorizing is the tendency to confuse theory based on meta-
phor with "reality" or 11fact." This mistakfog the map for 
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the territory is called reification (Sarbin, 1967)., hyposta-
tization (Turbayne, 1962), or misplaced concretion (Whitehead, 
1948). 
Paul Ricoeur had these words to say about this danger: 
A lfoe of demarcation should be drawn 
between "to use'1 and "to be used," lest 
we fall victim to metaphor, mistaking 
the mask for the face. In brief, we must 
"expose11 metaphor, unmask it. This proxi-
mity between use and abuse leads to a 
correction of the metaphors about 
metaphor. . . . facts are rea 11 o-
cated by metaphor; but such reallo-
cation is also a misallocation. Meta-
phor has been compared to a filter, 
a screen, and lens, in order to say 
that it places things under a pers-
pective and instructs us to "see as 
11 
"to explode a myth" 
is to expose the model for the meta-
phor. . .. critical consciousness 
of the distinction between use and 
abuse leads not to disuse but to re-
use of metaphors, in the endless 
search for other metaphors, namely a 
metaphor that would be the best one 
possible. (Ricoeur, 1975, pp. 252-3) 
Given these dangers then, of allowing experience to 
be interpreted for us by the metaphors we embrace, of mis-
taking the metaphor for reality, of being used by metaphor, 
what can we do to escape our own delimited worlds? The 
answer, I believe, lies partly in the sort of critical 
thinking on a philosophical level as follows in an analysis 
of the extant metaphorical interpretations of human behavior 
seen as painful, self-inflicted, and problematic. "The 
greatest thing by far," said Aristotle, "is to be master 
of metaphor." (Turbayne, 1962, p. 21). This sort of review 
and re-interpretation does not assemble empirical studies 
and perform meta-anaiyses of data. This is a theoretical/ 
philosophical work reaching toward the assumptions under-
lying such research. 
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The Neurotic Paradox 
Having stated the thesis that theori"es attempting to 
accurately define the image of man are essentially metaphori-
cal, and that the models rooted in these metaohors carry 
with them certain inherent dangers, the assumptfon to be 
added is that the conflict in osychology as described earlier 
may be seen to be intimately related to this. It would be 
an enormous task to undertake an analysis of the major 
11forces" in psychology on the whole. It can be realistically 
and relevant ly explored, however, through an analysis of how 
the major models of human behavio~ based on their respec-
tive metaphorical images, farein a theoretical/ohilosophical 
analysis of how adequately they each provide understanding 
of a specific category of human behavior kno\'m as the neurotic 
p~radox (NP). The strengths and weaknesses of the various 
models will be stated. 
The NP is simply that some peoole who are assumed to 
be motivated by pleasure often exhibit behavior which 
brings about personal suffering and defeat. Apparently, 
these people are unable to change their behavior and to 
prevent pain from recurring. The title was formally 
assigned by O. Hobart Mowrer (1948) in his analysis and 
critique of Freud's writings. 
Interest in this behavior does not derive simply from 
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seeing man suffering or being defeated. Most people are able 
to conceive of and admit their weaknesses in the face of 
powerful natural and social forces with which they must 
contend. Defeat is a humiliating, painful, and a potentially 
destructive outcome. Both psychology and theology have 
addressed themselves to the effects of defeat upon a life. 
A number of metaphors , models, and myths of human behavior 
concern themselves with the human spirit as it faces over-
whelming odds and sometimes succumbs. We see var i ous images 
of heroic and tragic people. But defeat is not the exact 
focus of the behavior to be discussed in this paper. 
Suffering and defeat are not paradoxical in themselves. 
Of greater fascination for man, to himself and for 
psychologists, has been suffering and defeat in which the 
individual is personally involved: self-defeat. It has 
been exceptionally difficult for man to grasp the meaning 
of personally inflicted suffering. Such behavior seems to 
border on II insanity" because it cha 11 enges the va 1 i dity of 
some of our fundamental rationalistic assumptions. 
Of almost total perplexity to the human mind is the 
behavior of repetitive self-inflicted suffering and repeti-
tive self-defeat. Not only do some people defeat themselves, 
but they wil 1 repeat th.e same behavior. 
Defeat surely is a wound to the human spirit; self-defeat 
or self-punishment is almost mentally incomprehensible; 
but, repetitive self-defeat seems beyond understanding. It 
is paradoxical for it leads to contradictory conclusions -
from logical deductions drawn from our common perceptual 
and conceptual backgrounds. It is this repetitive self-
defeating paradoxical behavior which is of specific interest 
presently. 
There is yet another provocative and paradoxical thing 
about repetitive self-inflicted suffering. These people 
sometimes appear to be creative and they often seem to 
be ahead of the masses, predictively pointing the way in 
which the society or culture may go. Rollo May (1969) 
and Norman 0. Brown (_1959) have written about such para-
doxical behavior and its relation to, if not the foundation 
for, creativity and predictive understanding of the future 
of a society. May wrote, "The problems of ( our day) have a 
curious characteristic not yet adequately appreciated: 
They pre di ct the future." (_May, 1969, p. 18). Again, 
"Art and neurosis both have a predictive function." (May, 
1969, p. 21). 
The writings of philosopher Michael Polanyi provide 
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an explanation which is very helpful in understanding this 
creative and predictive characteristic of some behavior, both 
normal and neurotic. The predictive nature of neurosis may 
be seen as follows: When a relational system (a logic, a 
science, a society, or a personality) has been thoroughly 
exploited in terms of its seminal, generative, discoverable 
relations, the limits of the underlying generic relational 
set begin to emerge. At this stage, the emergence of the 
limits of a system tend to take the form of paradoxical 
deductions (see Polanyi, 1951, 1959, 1969) . These paradoxes 
emerge from the generic set of relations but they also point 
in the direction of potential resolutions and/or solutions. 
This process, I believe, may be seen in the functioning 
of the neurotic personality as well as in the historical 
shifting of paradigms within the sciences. The deductions 
fo 11 owing the conceptua 1 structure of a theory, or the 
behaviors (acts, feelings) based on an existing personality 
structure may eventually become anomalous (to use Kuhn1 s 
terminology); inconsistent in some way and perhaps lead 
to a crisis, or a neurotic way of behaving. This is 
an indication that the limitations within the relational 
system are emerging. New meaning is needed. People at 
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the point of paradox, who live with it, through it, and begin 
to solve it (rather than escape from it), build the 
future by opening up possibilities. Man, therefore, is 
viewed here as a transcending organism. The nature of the 
inconsistencies (anomalies, contradi"ctions, antimonies, 
paradoxes) provides clues as to the needed modification of 
the existing relational system, or the creation and imple-
mentation of a new metaphor. 
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An additional element of understanding comes from Kuhn 
ll970). It may be as Kuhn suggests that when the paradoxical 
stage is reached it takes a new metaphor to unleash creative 
progress and to provide the solutions to such paradoxes. 
But before new metaphors can be used, the hold of previous 
metaphors must be broken. This conflict can be seen as similar 
to the crisis which the neurotic person feels . Accepting 
Polanyi and Kuhn1 s interpretations provides a specific 
explanation of the predictive nature of neurotic behavior. 
In summary, an adequate model of the behavior upon which 
we are focusing will need to be able to explain the follow-
ing defining characteristics of the NP: 
(1) Self-inflicted suffering and defeat, 
(2) Repetitiveness of self-defeating behavior, 
(3) The paradoxical nature of the behavior, 
(4) The creative and predictive potential of the behavior. 
In the following sections of this paper will be found 
analyses intended to show h.ow neurotic behavior has been 
interpreted by the prominent extant models. Through the 
centuries models of man have been drawn from relatively 
few metaphors. The major ones have been Spirit, Disease, 
Machine, and Seed (see Langer, J., 1969; and Mehrabian, 
1968, for further discussion of these basic metaphors and 
examples of their use in personality theory). Specifically, 
these metaphors have been implemented to state that: 
(1) The relation between a person and his behavior 
is like the relation between behavior and a spirit 
which inhabits a person (Spirit). 
(2) The relation between a person and his behavior 
is like the relation between a disease and the 
symptoms (Freud, 1964). 
(3) The relation between a person and his behavior 
is like the relation between a machine and its 
action or product (Skinner, 1971). 
(4) The relation between a person and his behavior 
is like the relation between a seed and a flower 
or fruit (Maslow, 1962). 
The limitations of each metaphor will be discussed 
with regard to that model's adequacy to provide understanding 
of the four basic defining characteristics of the NP which 
are listed above. 
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Inhabitation Model of the Neurotic Paradox (Spiri .t Metaphor) 
This historically earliest interpretation of the NP was 
not in model form. It existed before men understood the use 
of models. 
In terms of early attitudes about persons who repeti-
tively exhibited self-destructive behaviors, which they 
seemingly could not change, they were considered to be 
ignorant, mistaken, cheating, or sinning (Alexander & 
Selesnick, 1966). It was assumed, probably on the basis of 
a combination of Greek and Christian thought, that if these 
people were ignorant or mistaken they should be instructed 
and they would, natura1ly and rationally , change their 
behavior. If they were cheating they would be punished and 
they would change to avoid pain. 
Inhabitation Model 
If the self-defeating repetitive behavior continued in 
spite of corrective instruction, punishment, or confession 
and restitution, it was easy to fall back to an historically 
earlier understanding in which the fundamental model was 
possession or inhabitation. 
For centuries, we conjecture, man had attempted to 
understand his own mysterious self through metaphors drawn 
from human experiences with inanimate objects and physical 
movements. The primary relationship was that things move. 
Men experienced th.em move, but did not experience why 
they moved or the causal relationships between their move-
ments. Consequently, man created a metaphori'cal relati'on 
and projected the experience he had of himself as a mover. 
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Physical objects became inhabited in the same way as man 
felt he inhabited his body and, within it, made things move. 
However, when men could not understand their own actions and 
movements, the projection was introjected metaphorically 
and man himself became inhabited. These spirits caused 
man to do paradoxical things like repetitively hurt himself 
(Alexander & Selesnick, 1966). 
The basic model was inh.abitation by a s-pir-ft . The 
fundamental metaphor was one between inner feelings of 
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causing one's self to move and inanimate movements. Ex-
panded, this metaphor became the mythology of spooks, spirits, 
and ghosts. 
Even from a traditional Christian position affinning 
the existence of God, the model does not essentially change, 
Satanic forces are the cause of this kind of behavior. The 
problem remains how to deal with Satan's inhabitation. 
Exorcism became the 11therapy. 11 To help the process, 
experts emerged in the form of priests and their perversion 
into magicians (Goshen, 1967). 
Inhabitation Mode.l and the Defin-
ing Characteristics of the NP 
Now, if we compare this model to the four defining 
characteristics of paradoxical neurotic behavior, some 
interesting implications arise. 
Self-inflicted behavior. The self-inflicted nature of 
suffering and defeat are denied and logical and rational 
assumptions about man are maintained. This is a strong 
element which supported this model in an interesting way. 
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It is rational and logical if not empirical. (It is interest-
ing to note that this model also takes the responsibility for 
good, healthy behavior away from the self, apart from sin.) 
Repetitive behavior , The repetitiveness of the behavior 
is placed outside the person and beyond the.ir immediate 
control. However, they do remain partially culpable in 
the sense that they may be responsible for becoming repro-
bate enough for a spirit to enter. And freedom could be 
obtained for a remedy is available. The remedy is penance 
and restitution. Repetition of a behavior, thus, is un-
necessary and not paradoxical, but sinful. 
Paradoxical behavior. The paradoxical appearance 
of the behavior disappears since it is explained. The 
paradox is given ontological status. It is raised to the 
mythological level. Opposing gods are in serious conflict. 
Man is in some respects a helpless onlooker. But he is 
expected to be rationally and logically on the side of good 
unless he is reprobate and inhabited. Then he can do those 
things necessary to regain his placement on the s:ide of 
good. 
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Creative and predictive behavior- This behavior is 
also explained in this model. It is moved to the level of 
the will and intentions of the inhabiting spirit (which is 
understood in terms of a developed mythology) and the will 
and intentions of a man in herioc struggle with or against 
the gods. One needs little more information to begin to 
grasp the stability and power of this model and its ability 
to be creative and predictive regarding future life. Men 
lived it out. The bel i ef system was consistent and coherent. 
Critique of the Inhabitation Model 
As this model was explored and exploited over the cen-
turies, its finite limits began to be encountered. Dif-
ferent metaphors and models were proposed and paradoxes 
began to be generated. There are more of these than can 
be realistically considered here. Some major parado~es 
are that the model essentially makes man both responsible 
and irresponsible, it treats man both as rational and 
irrational, and it emphasizes spirit as real and the real 
as spirit. It gives meaning to how men become possessed 
with such strange behavior. 
This model essentially moves the NP to the mythological 
level where the conflict takes place between the gods. Man 
looks on as a victim. It is necessary to note that this 
movement of the paradox to the mythological level is the 
fundamental solution provided by this interpretation of the 
NP. 
The Spirit model may sound outmoded and unbelievable. 
Science has been able to show us, through a different 
metaphor, what most of the physical movements are, and has 
even demythologized man and his own movements. The need 
for anthropomorphic projections has greatly diminished. 
However, these metaphors are not completely dead. As long 
as science has not shown the complete interrelations of the 
universe we will have some mystery. On this basis, the 
fundamental power of the spiritualistic metaphors will 
remain and men will use them to understand. 
It would be very incorrect to believe that the spirit-
ualistic metaphor has eroded because it has been dis-
proved or because it does not work. As provocative to the 
scientific mind as it may be, it is a testimonial fact that 
on the basis of this model, through logic, punishment, 
exorcism or penance, for example, people do modify their 
behavior. They become dispossessed. 
We are presently undergoing a resurgence of the popu-
larity of this metaphor-model-myth. This is seen in the 
interest in things like UFO's, the occult, ESP, Zen Buddhism, 
other religions, drugs, and meditation (Samples, 1976). 
\.Jhat is being asserted here as a major h.ypothesis of 
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this paper is that any model will explain and it will be 
effective as long as it stands in a united, consistent, 
coherent, and socially accepted fashion. The logical and 
psychological integr'fty of the metaphor and the subsequent 
models and myths built upon it, taken together or separately, 
give it meaning and power. 
Old metaphors are not disproved, they are replaced. 5 
When an existing model is exploited to its limits a new 
metaphor has a chance to replace it. The scientific (me-
chanistic) metaphors have split the spiritualistic metaphor-
model-myth complex and it has began to erode. 
We would guess that if the integrity of the spiritualis-
tic metaphor could be restored and strengthened, for an 
individual or a society, its therapeutic and explanatory 
processes would again be effective. 
Freudian Model of the Neurotic Paradox (Disease Metaphor) 
It was Freud who provided the vocabulary and delineated 
the modern problem known as the NP. Instead of searching 
through all of Freud's writing, to follow the development of 
the NP in his theory, the reader is referred to Thompson 
(J957) and Ricoeur (1970). In his early clinical and 
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5Isreal Scheffler, in his book Science and Subjectivity 
(.1967), has disputed this view of science held 5y Thomas Kuhn, 
among others. His cl aims in defense of "objectivity" are 
answered by Kuhn in a postscript to the 1970 edition of 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 
theoretical experience, Freud had taken mechanistic, scien-
tific (medical}, and hedonistic positions. The fundamental 
life drive (libido) followed the 11pleasure principle 11 and 
worked mechanically (medically and biologically) . A mechan-
i stic-medical model has the three necessary elements: (J} 
a specific disease or trauma, (2) a specific course, (3) 
a specific outcome. Knowledge of these three things makes 
it possible to develop a specific intervention. These as-
sumptions and this model guided Freud's work even though he 
didn't think in terms of models. 
Freud was an acute and honest observer even if his 
observations were contradictory to his assumptions. He 
began to notice persons who exhibited behaviors which seemed 
counter to the "pleasure principle." These were cases of 
World War I veterans who would re-live their experiences 
and do so repetitively and with much pain. He also recog-
nized other patients such as hysterics who seemingly had no 
discoverable organic disease but who complained of physical 
suffering. Freud was motivated to develop a theoretical 
position which could explain these behaviors because they 
seemed so contradictory to his assumptions. This behavior 
could not be interpreted as sexual wish fulfillment (plea-
sure). This was why Freud saw this behavior as paradoxical. 
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Solution to NP 
There are three elements in Freud's solution to the 
NP. Two elements were theoretical. Tnese were thoroughly 
explicated by Freud. These were 1) the idea that symptoms 
are defenses binding anxiety over repressed wishes and 
fantasies; and later 2) the death instinct (Thanatos). 
They are in the realm of 11focal 11 knowledge (Polanyi, 1951). 
That is, these theorizations were the objects of conscious 
intell ectual attention and manipulation. In the language 
of the gestaltist, they provide the 11figure 11 in Freud's 
thought on which attention is drawn, against a backdrop 
of unnoticed assumptions. \~e will return to these. The 
third element was subtle and essentially a shift in 11tacit 11 
knowledge (Polanyi, 1951}. This provided the 11ground11 or 
backdrop to Freud's thought and was not explicated. Indeed, 
Polanyi 1 s definition of tacit knowledge specifies that is is 
a-critical, not subject to the scrutiny and analysis which 
focal awareness necessarily includes. 
Freud's Tacit Paradigm Shift 
Freud's tacit solution was essentially accomplished 
through authoritarian assertion and rhetoric based upon 
11science 11 and the medical model (Szasz, 1961). The theory 
went as follows: During infancy, behaviors are emitted 
on the basis of the pleasure principle (Idl. However, 
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the parents begin to "s.ocialize" the ch"fld by punishing 
forbidden actions (even thoughts) . Thus, a fundamental 
conflict between the pleasure prindple and reality principle 
develops. The child must learn to suppress or repress his 
"bad11 impulses and/or find socially approved ways to express 
them . .A.11 of this is for the purpose-of maximizing pleasure 
and reducing pain. 
There is one drive which was rigorously socialized in 
Freud's day and in regard to which it was not easy to find 
socially approved outlets. This is sex. Freud initially 
interpreted this problem in a narrow medical model. Severe 
socialization and/or sexual molestations cause trauma. 
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Freud actually sought for the organic damage caused in this 
way. He believed this damage created the symptoms of neurosis 
and if he could have found it he would have been able to 
fulfill the requirements of the medical model. He was not 
able to accomplish this. 
Freud was a creative thinker. When he began to realize 
that the traumatic experiences which his patients reported 
might be fantasies or wishes he followed this data and modified 
his theory. However, he never changed the "tacitly 11 held 
medical hypothesis: the 11ground11 from which he perceived 
the world. Patients continued to be looked upon as sick 
with all the privileges pertaining to this status. 
Th_is 11tacit 11 shift was the une.xplicated aspect of 
Freud1 s solution to the NP. Szasz (1961} believes that 
Freud took this attitude from Charcot. However Freud 
came upon it, he was a major contributor to its eventual 
social and cultural success. The triumph of this new para-
digm was based upon the authority exerted by science and 
medicine--not new knowledge or truth. The philosophical 
assumptions were never changed. For this reason, however, 
Freud1 s theory became a mtxed model (one built upon a 
hybrid of two metaphors: the disease and the spirit) 
which generated many contradictions. 
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Freud contributed to the erosion of the spiritualistic 
model by movfng "tacit 11 understanding from spirit to medicine. 
The medical model called for a new approach to treatment 
much more in line with modern scientific assumptions. 
Freud1 s Early Explication of the NP 
The first explicit interpretation of the NP took the 
following direction: If punishment was traumatically severe 
or inconsistent, the child developed a life style fn which 
repression and the reality principle dominate. Freud1 s 
significant insight was that in this condition, the energy 
of the pleasure principle is not reduced and it tends to 
return from the unconscious in disguised fonns (wishes, 
fantasies, and indirect behaviors) in an attempt to re-live 
and master or undo the original problematic situation or 
trauma. This was referred to as the return of the repressed 
and is his earliest model of the NP. Since the returned 
material is socially condemned and it is no longer under the 
subject's conscious control, the person will repetitively 
find himself in painful traumatic situations. Symptoms are 
behaviors which reduce the anxiety of this situation but 
which do not solve the underlying repression. Thus, this 
is an anxiety reduction and avoidance model. 
When repression is relatively weak, the forbidden 
impulses may threaten to merge into conscious awareness. 
Th_e person may then unconsciously administer self-punishment. 
This behavior will also appear to the subject as beyond his 
own control. He may even feel inhabited and be drawn into 
a spiritualistic interpretation of his behavior. 
Freud's Later Explication of the NP 
The second solution of the NP is an extension of the 
first. As Freud continued to work with WWI veterans and 
hysteric patients it became more difficult for him to 
theoretically account for the self-inflicted suffering 
through the model of the "return of the repressed." The 
drive and energy toward self-destruction seemed more uni-
versal and more persistent than the model could explain, 
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especially as the role of wish and fantasy came to dominate 
his thinking. Consequently, he posited another 11instinct 11 
or basic energy. This he called Thanatos, the death drive. 
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In proposing a death drive, in conflict with the life 
drive, Freud resolves th.e NP by making it an ontological prob-
lem. He actually perfonns the same maneuver that th.e 
spiritualistic interpreters did. He moved the solution to 
the mythological level. 
Freud was able to show how patients suffering from the 
11return of the repressed" could be treated through techniques 
to lift the repression. However, he did not resolve the 
ontological conflict between Eros and Thanatos. He increas-
ingly became directly interested in mythology and its con-
tribution to understanding th.is conflict. Individual neuro-
sis became universal social neurosis. 
Freud not only maintained that human 
history can be understood only as a neurosis 
but also that the neurosis of individuals 
can be understood only in the context of 
human history as a whole. (Brown, 1959, 
p. 12) 
Freudian Model and the Defin-
ing Characteristics of the NP 
Now let us examine the Freudian model in light of the 
four defining elements of the NP which have been listed. 
Self-inflicted behavior. The pain of neurosis is 
explained through the return of the repressed, and the 
development of symptoms which are essentially avoidance 
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techniques. The symptom represents both the biologically 
fundamental libidinal gratification and the imposed suffering 
inflicted by the super-ego. Society becomes the vi 11 i an. 
The neurotic is not possessed, he is not a sinner, he is a 
victim who has fallen ill because of traumatic repressive 
actions done unto him. He is ill. Thus, it tutns out that 
the suffering is not basically self-inflicted and the indi-
vidual is not responsible for his condition. 
In this interpretation the logical, rational, and self-
responsible elements of personality are reduced to a rigid 
determinism. Han is free from the paradox, but not personally 
free. Man is an organism which stands in eternal danger from 
the conflicts of his own drives. 
R~petitive behavior. Freud's model explains the 
repetitiveness of neurotic behavior by pointing out the 
need to undo or master a previously traumatic 1ife event by 
repeating it. But this is done unconsciously through 
symptoms and the situation is never really solved. Later, 
Freud began to believe that this tendency to repeat may be 
stronger than the pleasure principle. He then selected the 
model of the tendency of organic life to return to the 
inorganic state from which it came. Thus, repetitiveness. 
becomes an ontological problem. The repetitiveness is onto-
logical and beyond man's control. It is a biological and 
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determined action about which man has no choice. The NP is 
solved, but a larger problem is created. How can man control 
his aggressive destructive tendencies? 
Paradoxical behavior. The paradox of the NP is re-
solved in the Freudian model. However, it is resolved in a 
curious manner. Typically, behavior i.s first reduced to a 
biological language. However, the language turns out not to 
be the model-level language Freud claimed, but mythological-
level language. Consequently, it is fair to assert that the 
paradox is actually resolved by moving it to a mythological 
level. 
Creative and predictive behavior. Creativity for 
Freud was identical to illness, or neurosis. The general 
cause for illness is repression. Creativity can happen 
when reason is relaxed and the unconscious can tell its 
truth (Rieff, 1959, p. 90); or, when the person regresses 
and the truth escapes. Creativity of a person remains an 
ideosyncratic symptom for Freud (Arieti, 1976, p. 24). 
The creativity and predictability of the Freudian 
model really rests upon the success of the 11tacit 11 paradigm 
shift which Freud accomplished. The explicated models 
end in pessimistic predictions only. This shift was 
successful through mixing models even though it may have 
been unintentional. 
Therefore, according to the hypothesis of this paper, 
the Freudian model became effective because the disease 
metaphor and the generated model and myth came to 11stand 11 
within society. 
There is no denying the creative and predictive impact 
of psychoanalysis upon society. It is seen in art, litera-
ture, education, child rearing, business, advertising, and 
even religion. Even the pessimistic conflict between life 
and death seems predictive enough to worry many people. 
Critique of the Freudian Model 
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As psychoanalytic theory has been amplified and exploited 
over the years its limits are being exposed. Freudian thought 
is an exasperating mixture of realism and idealism, biology 
and mythology, detenninis.m and teleology, logic and rational-
ism and irrationalism, and many others. 
The most surprising thing which emerges from this 
analysis is that Freud's method of solving the NP is not 
different from that of the spiritualistic resolution. Both 
models use avoidance explanations and fundamentally move 
the NP to the mythological level to solve it. Even for 
Freud the struggle eventually is between the gods. Even if 
we grant that Freud wants to use the mythologies metaphor-
ically, the method is suspect to the scientific mind. 
Freud's model never seems to get legitimately 
reinterpreted into physical and biological language of a 
satisfactory nature to the scientist. On the other hand, 
Freud's denial about his gods is never quite enough for 
the spiritualists and there is a suspicion that psycho-
analysis may be a religion after all. 
Behavioral Model of the Neurotic Paradox (Machine Metaphor) 
The mechanistic model will now be considered in con-
junction with scientific pbilos ·ophy and methodology, as it 
was the model which superceded the spirit metaphor and 
tacitly supported the psychoanalytic model on 11scientific 11 
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(if not medical) ground. The mythology of behaviorism contains 
philosophical assumptions which deny the possibility of 
genuine or realistic paradoxes. Paradoxes are mistakes, 
incorrect operations of logic, linguistic excesses, or mixed 
metaphors (Turbayne, 1962).. Science is assumed to be 
based upon realism, logical positivism, operationalism, 
linear assumptions, Aristotelean logic, mechanism, and 
induction (_Maslow, 1966, p. 72ff). In spite of these 
attitudes, behaviorists were unable to ignore the NP. 
Early Behavioral Model 
A primary principle of learning, according to behavioral 
learning theory, is that emitted behavior v1hich is rewarded 
will be repeated. Skinner's radical behaviorism focuses 
more on the R in Watson's S-R (stimulus-response) formula. 
B.F. Skinner's 0953} system of operant conditioning is a 
descriptive behaviorism devoted entirely to the study of 
responses. He flatly rejects the language of subjective 
11mentalistic 11 concepts and leans so extremely toward an 
empirical tradition that he maintains he does not need a 
theoretical framework. Consequently, his behavioral model 
utilizes inductive reasoning which leads itsproponents to 
conclude that what is true of certain individual cases is 
true of all cases, or what is true at certain times , wi ll be 
true under the same circumstances at all times. In contrast, 
deduction is the process which starts with certain premises 
or propositions and attempts to draw valid conclusions from 
them. Noam Chomsky (1979) addresses the problems inherent 
in Skinner's inductive aoproach by questioning the 
generality of application of concepts derived from the 
relatively restricted type of behavior that Skinner has 
studied in his experimental programs. 
A second primary principle of Skinner 1 s brand of 
behaviorism is that behaviors which are unrewarded should 
extinguish (Sk.i nner, 1953 l. The occurrence of negative 
reinforcement is dis:tingui sh.ed from puni shme.nt in that th.e 
negative reinforcer (or aversive stimulus) increases the 
strength of the operant behavior to avoid that stimulus. 
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The NP stated in this language is: Why does behavior, 
motivated by reinforcing consequences, not discontinue where 
it in fact leads the organism into punishment or pain? 
Negative reinforcement should prevent the recurrence of 
such behavior, or in the absence of a reward--extinction 
should lead to an ending of the behavior. 
The explanation of this seemingly paradoxical behavior 
hinges on the hypothesis of avoidance response. Exti'nction 
is an active process and occurs only in the presence of the 
conditioned stimulus (.CS) without reinforcement (_negative CS 
in this case). If the organism is allowed to avoid the 
CS it will never learn that the punishment will not follow. 
Thus, the behavior will never extinguish. 
But why does the avoidance response itself never 
extinguish? Because the CS (_situation} causes an increase 
in drive (negative autonomic nervous system response} and 
avoidance causes a reduction in drive. This reduction is a 
positive reinforcement for avoidance behavior. Therefore, 
the avoidance response is continuously reinforced and the 
original conditioned response cannot extinguish. 
Temporal factors are important in this solution. If 
the avoidance response can be delayed until non-punishment 
occurs, or a counter-response is elicited, then extinction, 
or counter-conditioning may take place. In other words, 
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long-tenn pleasure is given up in favor of sh.ort-tenn 
pleasure (Mowrer, 1948). 
For the behaviorist, using this solution to the NP and 
the assumptions of this philosophy of science, neurosis fs 
a mistake based upon avoidance behavior. 
Mowrer1 s Critique of the Avoidance Model 
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Mowrer has lead a concerted attack against both Freudianism 
and Skinner's naive behaviorism. He believes the two 
solutions to the NP are not essentially different since. they 
both are avoidance models. 
Perhaps Mowrer's most direct point is that both ap-
proaches " . are predicated on the contrary as sump ti on 
of the es sen ti al permanence of some (why not a 11?} fears 
unless they are subjected to special 'treatment 1 procedures." 
(Mowrer, 1964, p. 217). In other words, these solutions 
of the NP are contrary to the well-established principles 
of extinction. That is, to continue approaching th.e foi-
tially aversive situation (_CS) without experiencing some 
sort of contiguous reinforcement is contradictory to be-
haviorist law. Mowrer argues that these explanations are 
very circuitous in their attempt to get around this principle 
in its most direct application, and violate the principle 
of parsimony. 
But Mowrer a1so be1ieves this naive behavioral exp1a-
nation vio1ates 1earning theory in an even more direct way. 
Where, we may ask, is the evidence that 
fears are either established or perpe-
tuated by means of rewards? Habits, as 
overt, voluntary behavior, are reinforced 
in this way. But fears, which are 
mediated by the autonomic nervous 
sys tern (_and are i nvo 1 untary), are 
established and perpetuated by means 
of punishment (_drive increment}, not 
by means of reward (_drive decrement}. 
The notion that fears are reinforced 
by rewards is thus not a 1egitimate 
app1ication of 'learning theory' but 
a perversion thereof. 01owrer, 1964, 
p. 21S) 
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The same critique is applied by Mowrer to Dollard and Mi11er 
(.1950) , Wolpe (.1958) , and Szasz (_ 1961 ) . 
Mowrer's Solution 
Mowrer has been interested in developing a neo-behavior-
istic learning theory which could account for 11 .. goal 
directed, purposive, deliberate, or, if you will, free and 
responsib1e behavior. 11 (Mowrer, 1964, p·. 11). Fundamenta1 
to his model is the princip1e of cybernetics. Mowrer 
proposed a mediationa1 theory of 1earning in which both 
fear (and avoidance responses) and hope (and approach res-
ponses) are conditioned reactions which, as feedback 
occurs, allow the organism to guide his behavior instead 
of simply react. 
Applied to the NP, Mowrer's model would indfcate that 
the neurotic refuses to heed the fe~dback he is receiving 
(_in the fonn of hope and approach responses l and instead 
he goes ahead with uncorrected responses with the desire 
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to achieve advantage. Because of this, the neurotic has a 
real stimulus of which to be afraid. The fear is not unreal. 
Mowrer concludes: II . so ca 11 ed psychoneuroses. and 
functional psychoses can b.e understood only in terms of 
palpable misconduct which has not been confessed or 
expiated." (Mowrer, 1964, p. 20). 
Arguing with Szasz ll961), that neurosis involves 
play-acting, impersonation, deception and cheating, Mowrer 
says this is the way it begins and is perpetuated. "But in 
its manifest, explicit fonn neurosis also involves an in-
vo 1 untary out-cropping of the truth." (}1owrer, 1964, p. 139). 
The truth is that the neurotic is disregarding hope for change 
and refuses to emit approach responses. He is unwilling to 
change. This out-cropping is the symptomatology of the 
neurotic. The derivation of the symptoms is the conscience 
which makes the neurotic different from the sociopath because 
the neurotic has the decency to suffer even though he is hid-
ing. The neurotic represees the super-ego, according to 
Mowrer, rather than the id, as Freud held. 
It is not that 11symptoms11 merely re-
present a strategy by means of which the 
individual displaying them is trying 
to manipulate others, in a selfish, 
infantile, irresponsible way. It is 
rather that a symptom is indeed a form 
of 11communication,11 not in this mani-
pulative sense, but as an involuntar 
confession which the individual ego 
conti'nues to try to avoid but which 
11the voice within 11 (super-ego) is trying 
to effectuate. (Mowrer, 1964, p. 134) 
But why do human beings err in the first place? ''Not 
because we are necessarily stupid or inherently evil, but 
because we are personally inexperienced and unwilling to 
'take the word' of others. 11 (Mowrer, 1964, p. 228). 
Mowrer does not explain how this deduction is generated by 
his model. 
Treatment for neurotic behavior is confession, restitu-
tion, and re-establishment in "community11 ; or, fellowship 
with other people. This means that one takes the instruction 
of other people and does not hide the failure to do so. 
Thus, 11therapy 11 cannot be predicated 
on any such simple program as extinc-
tion or counter-conditioning. Instead, 
the desideratum, as Jourard properly 
notes, is that of courage, the courage 
to be known. (Mowrer, 1964, p. 233) 
Behavioral Models and the Defin-
ing Characteristics of th.e NP 
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As the discussion demonstrates, there are two behavioral 
models, the early avoidance model and Mowrer's two-factor model. 
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Avoidance Model 
Self-inflicted behavior. The defeat of the neurotic 
is explained as secondary unintended results of avoidance 
behavior. The avoidance behavior does not in fact prevent 
the primary pain or suffering, but it does reduce the anxiety 
and the person temporarily feels better. It is a substitu-
tion which helps the person avoid the fundamental problem. 
The temporal element is important in that short - term pleasure 
is pre-potent over long-term pleasure . 
Repetitive behavior. . The repetitiveness of the behavior 
is explained through drive reduction acting as a reinforce-
ment. But since the fundamental problem is not solved, the 
anxiety will return and again need to be avoided. 
Paradoxical behavior. Paradoxical behavior disappears 
because the requirements of behavioristic mythology are· met. 
The underlying physical properties, condittons and relations 
are described. The explanation seems reasonable. However, 
as shall be shown in the critique, the whole system remains 
paradoxical. 
Creative and predictive behavior. According to Skinner, 
creativity is the emission of a novel, low probability 
response from the response hierarchy, which achieves posi-
tive reinforcement from the environment. Creativity, in 
its old-fashioned meaning, goes out with the qualities of 
freedom and dignity. The creative and predictive potential 
of neurotic behavior is not well explained in an avoidance 
model. All creativity becomes substitutive, secondary and 
epi-phenomenal behavior. In this mythology, neurosis is 
stupidity and cannot have fundamental predictive validity. 
Criticism of the Avoidance Model 
In addition to the criticisms wh.ich Mowrer gave, the 
following items are relevant. The drive reduction hypo-
thesis has not stood the test of empirical research. The 
model cannot e.xplain the phenomena of "secondary gain 11 which 
is an important factor in neurotic behavior. The secondary 
benefits (or liabilities) of exhibiting neurotic behavior 
are not easily accounted for through drive reduction and/or 
extinction concepts. The model cannot e.xplain the origin 
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of tne responses which. become symptoms. The model is circular 
and paradoxical: How can an organism avoid a situation 
without recognizing it, but if it is recognized, how is it 
avoided? 
There is much written which points out the many 
paradoxes of mechanism (Bronowsk i , 1956; Turbayne, 1962; 
Maslow, 1966; Matson, 1976; Chomsky, 1971). There are also 
many ways that the limiting paradox of Skinner's writing 
has been stated. Matson worded it thusly: "Where man 
himself is empty, passive, only awaiting the sculptor's 
hand, his society palpitates with ongoing motivations and 
manifest destiny." (1976, p. 117). 
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Consequently, behaviorism becomes extremely conservative. 
It is not the reform of society which behaviorists pursue. 
It is the reform of individuals through adjustment. 
As various critics have pointed out, 
there is a curious contradiction in this 
line of argument. For, if Skinner is 
correct in his deterministic assump-
tions, then his argu~ent is superflous 
and futile since (as Paul Kurtz has put 
it) 11if everything we do is strict1y 
detennined, then we cannot choose to 
master or control the environment, nor 
can we choose to follow Skinner's 
recommendations, unless we are detennined 
(by the external forces ) to do so.'' On 
the other hand, i f there is any point 
at all to the discussion--if we can act 
upon the environment, design ourcultures 
and initiate behavior techniques--Skinner 
is thoroughly refuted on his basic premises. 
(Matson, 1976, p. 123) 
Mowrer' s Mode 1
Self-inflicted behavior. Suffering is the conscience 
reminding the person he has done wrong. In this sense the 
self-inflicted suffering is admitted as legitimate, normal, 
and moral behavior. Avoidance is an escape and a cover-up. 
Repetitive behavior. The repetitiveness of the behavior 
is explained on the basis that the conscience has a real 
sin with which to contend. There is a stimulus to fear. 
Avoidance is only temporary and the fear will return. Only 
confession can stop the vicious circle. 
Paradoxical behavior. the paradoxical appearance of 
the behavior is translated into a lie. 
Creative and predictive behavior. The creative and 
predictive nature of neurotic behavior is seen only in a 
short-term sense. It has corrective and directive value. 
Criticism of Mowrer1 s Model 
Surprisingly, Mowrer1 s model comes out more like the 
spiritualistic model than either the psychoanalytic or 
earlier behavior models. It is very difficult to see the 
way in which Mowrer dertves his final solution, that men 
are not evil or stupid, but are hiding, from his model. 
It is probable that this conclusion comes from moralistic 
and rationalistic metaph.ors and mythology. The interpre-
tation Mowrer gave his model is easily translated into 
authoritarianism. We shall also see that it is similar to 
the existential model in that the final solution is moral 
fortitude, conviction and courage. The model does not re-
veal the source of courage. 
General Critique of Behavioral Models 
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As behavioristic models have been exploited and explored, 
they have become the dominant approach in modern American 
psychology. At the same time, it has come to be seen as 
a paradoxical system. Its definitions are essentially cir-
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cular and it is paradoxical in nature for it has no way to 
explain avoidance except through "infinite regresses." 
(Mehrabian, 1968, p. 97). David Bakan puts this conclusion in 
strong 1 anguage: "The de 1 i neati on, abstraction, and i dentifi-
cati on of the stimulus is the response." (Bakan, 1968, 
p. 56). 
Another critical issue is the problem of induction. 
Induction is a foundational assumption of his model. For 
a general introduction and discussion of this issue, the 
reader is referred to Jordan (1968, p. 123ff}. Popper 
expressed the problem this way: The whole inductive program 
of science underlying behaviorism is paradoxical (Popper, 
1962, p. 42f f) . 
A critical issue today is the problem of meaning. 
Behaviorism has become a victim of its own reductionism and 
apparently must commit verbal redefinition to explain 
behavior on a meaningful scale. The simple models examined 
here can legitimately deal only with very specific and limited 
behaviors. Even though B.F. Skinner has explicitly taken 
a life-long atheoretical position, he could not resist 
trying to give his theory meaning in his book Beyond Free-
dom and Dignity (Skinner, 1971). It should be noted that 
this book is essential1y a mythology generalized from his 
metaphors, model, and assumptions. 6 
Perhaps most surprising from the analysis is that 
Mowrer is correct in showing the essential similarity of the 
Freudian and behavioral models. They are both avoidance 
and drive reduction models. 
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And, Mowrer1 s model, in attempting to refute the 
freudian and naive behavioristic mode1s, becomes very similar 
to the spiritualistic and existential models. 
Existential Model of the Neurotic Paradox (Seed Metaphor) 
Existential ism, humanism, and phenomenology do not fonn 
a well-unified philosophy or psychology. The common simi-
larity they share is th.e metaphor of the Seed. Seeds grow, 
develop, fulfill, and actualize. The "within" is important 
rather than stimuli or responses. You do not create the 
qualities which emerge from a seed. You set the conditions 
which pennit them to develop and prevent damage. Exfstential 
emphasis on freedom stands in sharp contrast to Freudian and 
behavioristic detenninism. Existentialism emphasizes the 
future and becomingness, as opposed to the past and fixedness. 
Each individual is held to be unique and so cannot be forced 
into a categorical mold. Existentialism, humanism, and 
6For an excellent review of Skinner and radfcal behavior-
; sm, see Noam Chomsky's New York Book Rev1'ew art i c 1 e, ''The 
Ca~e Against B.F. Skinner," 1971. Th_e language and ass·umptions 
Skinner uses to construct his model are expertly revealed. 
phenomenology also share antagonisms: They are negative to 
mechanistic, reductive, and disease metaphors about man. 
Model of the NP 
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Sartre, who is mainly a philosopher, and May, a psy-
chologist, have provided similar verbalizations of the NP from 
the point of view of existentialism. It is this: "How 
can we conceive of a knowledge which is ignorant of itself?" 
(Chein, 1972, p. 92). In other words, how do you deceive 
yourself without knowing You are deceiving yourself? 
According to existential thought, man is alone in a 
morally neutral and indifferent univer?e. Within him is all 
that he has. There are no apriori reasons and purposes. 
There is no established meaning to life. 
Because freedom is inherent in being, so is anxiety. 
To choose is necessarily to take risks, possibly to lose all 
or to make a disastrous choice, or to confront the meaning-
lessness and dark aspects of being. Being is aware of its 
own finitude. Therefore, added to anxiety (inherent in choice) 
is dread of non-being. Anxiety may impel a flight into an 
inauthentic mode of existence--detachrnent, hedonistic pursuits, 
or loss of individualism in confonnity. Anxiety can be 
lessened by authentic living through commitment. In doing so 
the ontological anxiety is covered and one feels less anxious. 
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The authentic man must make honest choices with full awareness 
of the consequences even if these involve an increase in 
anxiety. Nevertheless, one continues to be existentially 
anxious. It is in this way that life becomes a deception 
without one knowing it. 
The Existential Solution to the NP 
Interestingly, existentialism does not attempt to re-
solve the paradox. Sartre's answer to the ques.tion of self-
deceit is that you deceive yourself by lying to yourself 
and then "livi ng into" the lie. One.attempts to make the 
lie more real than being. You deceive yourself by refusing 
to accept responsibility for yourself and by not constitut-
ing your own being through choice and decision. Sartre 
called this "bad faith;" Eric Fromm ca1led it Escaoe From 
Freedom, (Fromm, 1 941 ) . 
The paradox stands: man must suffer either as a false 
self or as a being alone in the universe. The existential-
ists' answer is bravery. It takes will and strength. It is 
a tragic view similar to Freud and Mowrer: 
The drama (Oedipus as retranslated 
by Ro 11 o May). is the tragedy of see-
ing the reality about oneself, con-
fronting what one is and what one's 
origin is, the tragedy of man know-
ing and facing conscious self-know-
ledge his own destiny. (May, 1967, 
p. 101} 
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May indicates to us that, 11To live with sensitivity 
in this age of limbo indeed requires courage.'' (May, 1975, 
p. 1). The obstruction to courage is the contradiction that 
one must be fully committed to the act of bravery yet remain 
aware that at the same time, one may possibl y be wrong. May 
concludes: 11My freedom ... in any genuine sense ... i s to 
live in the dialectic relation. 11 (May, 1967, p. 101).. 
People who become neu!"otic deceive themselves and 
refuse to II spe 11 out II how they are engaged in the rea 1 
world. 
Neurotic guilt--as is the case 
with neurotic anxiety--is simply 
the end result of unconfronted, 
repressed, normal guilt. (Jv1ay, 
1967, p. 108} 
Rollo May (1950, 1969, 19.75). has provided us with an 
interpretation of the seed metaphor which may appear more 
optimistic, but upon examination, reveals a basic image of 
man in line with most other existentialists. He uses a 
concept of eras which includes the diamonic, defined as 11any 
natural function which has the power to take over the whole 
person11 (May 1969, p. 123}. Sex, anger, rage, and the craving 
for power are examples. In seeking love (eras) to overcome 
existential anxiety, there is death; the possibility of 
destruction in one 1 s present state of existence (anxious as 
it is) and being thrown into a void with even less security. 
"May holds that man must confront 
... what is tragic in our day, namely 
the complete confusion, banality, ambiguity, 
and vaccuum of ethical standards and the 
consequent inability to act ... (May, 
1969, p. 10) 
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He maintains that man must courageously transcend the diamonic 
by "taking a stand," and integrating this shadow of Being into 
h.imself, aspiring toward a deepening and widening of his 
consciousness leading to creative growth. The paradox, 
May points out, is that it is, at one and the same time, 
a potentially creative and destructive act. 
Man1 s attempts to make meaningful the seemingly point-
less efforts in Being (the fate symbolized in the eternal 
going and returning, laboring and resting and laboring again, 
growing and disintegrating and growing again portrayed in 
the tale of Sisyphus) is a recognition of our fate, and the 
beginning of finding meaning in an otherwise meaningless 
fatalism. 7 While we may not negate or mitigate the evil, 
horror, and inevitable anxiety of Being, 11 ••• we find 
ourselves better able to encounter it and less lonely because 
we encounter it together. 11 (May, 1969, p. 302). 
It is in a relationship of caring that we are able to 
survive the cynicism and apathy which are the psychological 
illnesses of our day. So alienation is recast, in the 
11schizoid system" of technological man, as a loss of the 
capacity to be ulUmately personal. Courage is shifted from 
7The implementation of this myth to describe the existential 
position is credited to Albert Camus fo The Myth of Sisyphus, New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955. 
simply fighting society's mores to the inward capacity to 
corrnnit one's self, through love and will, to another human 
being. Tragedy is in how we as humans relate to the in-
escapable necessities of human fate. 
Existential Model and the Defin-
ing Characteristics of the NP 
Self-inflicted behavior. The existential model explains 
the self-inflicted nature of neurotic behavior as being 
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due to escape from man's fundamental ontological status in 
being, or the anxiety of unauthentic experience. Neurotic 
behavior is non-self-fulfilling and deceptive. One is usually 
unaware of the self-infliction because the fundamental 
avoidance is denied and the pseudo-existence is strongly 
asserted. 
Repetitive behavior. The repetitiveness of neurotic 
behavior is explained. The person must repeatedly assert 
the reality of the pseudo-existence he has adopted. Each 
momentary glimpse of the underlying emptiness and/or de-
ceptiveness requires a stronger assertion of the assumed 
self. 
Paradoxical behavior. Life is paradoxical because few 
men are able to stand in the tension of being and not escape. 
To stand in being is to experience the reality of "nothing-
ness" and th.e ontological meaning of anxiety. To es.cape is 
to experience the anxiety of falseness and deceit. There is 
no satisfactory way out. 
Creative and predictive behavior. Existentialism has 
been particularly excellent at describing man's predica-
ment. As a humanist, Maslow takes man as the model of man. 
He de.parted from previous psychologists and studied "healthy 
specimens." In this way, he found self-actualizing people 
to all be creative. Thus, it is the essence of man to be 
creative, and the more creative the more freely human a 
person he is . Creativity is a "genetic" quality which 
needs to be supported and permitted to grow, develop, and 
actualize. In other words, it is reasonable to say that 
creativity is self-expression in the existentialist frame-
work. It is potential in all persons and is seen in the 
lives of self-actualizers . 
The limiting paradox of this model is the problem of 
self-reflexivity. The subject and object are identical. All 
self-expression is not creative, nor developmental, or good. 
We never know what the seed is until it grows. The future 
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is not to be stated, it is to be discovered. The explanation 
of the creative and predictive potential of neurotic behavior 
is essentially pessimistic and apparently does not go beyond 
this. Concepts such as the "goodness of man" and the "free-
dom of man" are not really derived from the seed metaphor, 
but are carried in from an humanistic philosophical bias. 
The literature of existentialism is darkly tragic except 
for that of a few thinkers like Kierkegaard. He moves beyond 
the existential crisis through a "leap of faith" (.Bretall, 
1951,p.255). 
Critique of the Existential Model 
The existential approach has produced much rhetoric 
and literature, but little theoretical advance. (Braginsky, 
& Braginsky, 1974). It is essentially an avoidance model 
which allows for no avoidance. In this manner it is 
simjlar to both psychoanalysis and behaviorism. It may be 
seen as equally pessimistic in the sense that its basic 
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image of man portrays him as 1 ost, 1 eft up to h.i s own devi"ces 
to create meaning our of meaninglessness, and without any 
frame of reference or rules from which his risky steps toward 
authentic Being may be measured. 
It is a circular system. Using Maslow as an e.xample, 
the Braginskys' make this point clear: 
a brief examination of some of these 
testable propositions will be suffi-
cient to indicate that Maslow, like 
Skinner, presents us with nothing more 
than his own value premises in the guise 
of a "theory"; that his propositions 
and central concepts, like Skinner's, 
are tautological and untestable. 
(Braginsky & Braginsky, 1974, p. 78) 
Again, these same authors write: 
This "testable" proposition, then, 
tells us that to be self-actualizing, 
_2.l definition, a person is "meta-
motivated.11 How do we know that he is 
metamotivated? Because he is self-
actualizing. Circularity is by no 
means the exclusive property of the 
behaviorists. ( Bragi ns ky & Bragi nsky, 
1974, p. 79) 
One of the interesting ch.aracteristks of the existen-
tial-humanist movement has been its group or social activism 
in the face of an ontol6gically individualistic problem. 
The group therapy movement, altered states of consciousness, 
etc., are very attractive to existentialists and humanists. 
Like behaviorism and psychoanalysis, the model does 
change the language used to talk about man. Thfs change is 
more significant than appears on the surface. Translations 
do sometimes create different meanings: 
Thus just as the behaviorists have 
eliminated the chance for under-
standing man by using object rather 
than people language, the humanists 
have done the same by destryoing the 
meaning of people language. (Braginsky 
& Braginsky, 1974, p. 81) 
The existential model seems to be a description of the 
NP which has no solution except a call to bravery. There is 
no explanation of how one becomes brave other than to accept 
one's givenness. Mowrer and Freud conclude with this same 
call for bravery. 
Summary and Discussion 
I have been working wfth the conclusion th.at an image 
of man includes the original metaphor asserted to provide 
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meaning for understanding and predicting behavior, and the 
subsequent models and myths generated by that metaphor. 
The intent of this essay, as stated at the beginning, 
has been to impact the attitude of the reader interested 
in the state of affairs in psychology due to the various 
metaphors used to describe and give-meaning to the image of 
man. I hope that this interpretation of the literature and 
th.e conflict has brought light to a few of the contradi ctfons 
and patterns of resolution employed by the great thinkers in 
psychology. The point has not been to topple any theories 
based on any of the metaphors. The point is the process we 
go through in interpreting and attempting to resolve problems 
like the neurotic paradox. 
We have seen that fundamentally all the models of the NP 
ana 1 yzed above have reso 1 ved the paradox by moving it tcr the 
mythological level. This is generally permissable; except, 
the models themselves to not include this solution within 
their own interpretive rules. There are two essential pro-
blems with this solution even though the models .may be 
partially effective on the practical level. 
First, as particularly exemplified by the. Freudian and 
behavioristic models, the root metaphor is expanded to the 
myth level apparently without recognition of this fact. 
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While a clinician may maintain a certain distance in appropriating 
any one or a number of the images of man in doing therapy, 
the theodst generating the metaphors, myths, and models 
does not have the freedom or interpretive rules within the 
images presented to transcend the limitations he encounters. 
Second, because each of the models we have considered 
is on one level, they become paradoxical because they tend 
to get caught in self-referring thought and language and 
contain .no explanatory relations or rules w~ich allow for 
transcending their own paradoxes. They tend to be closed 
systems. We have seen in the critique of each model that it 
is doubtful if any escape paradoxical status. Perhaps the 
important meaning of this is that they turn out to be very 
limited models. Their generative potential is rapidly ex-
hausted and the resultant paradoxes become acute rather 
rapidly. 
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Creativity for Freud is a result of sickness; for Skinner 
it is an improbable response in the "response hierarchy;" 
for Maslow i.t is being the best human you can possibly be. 
None of these psychologi.es can help in understanding man as 
a creative being. 
Probably a 11 metaphors have a 1 imi ted di scl os:ure range. 
Some, however, may provide more interpretive power than others. 
The limits of the metaphor and generated models and 
myths are discovered in several ways. First, the 11fit 11 of 
the image with the phenomena being experienced begins to be 
too loose. In this case it will no longer give adequate 
meaning to experience. 
Second, the usefulness of a metaphor may become limited 
when it becomes eroded. This is, it becomes so common it is 
no longer recognized as an interpretation. It is perhaps 
reified and taken as "reality 11 uncritically. It becomes a 
closed system. Meaning and understanding become arbitrary 
and rigid. 
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Third, interactions between different models (mixing 
metaphors) may cause conflicts. For various domains of ex-
perience we can have simultaneously different metaphorical 
frameworks. I be 1 i eve the prob 1 ems of clients in therapy may 
be understood in this way. A person may hold conflicting 
metaphorical understandings of his conflicts and experience 
the anxiety described earlier. A therapist's role may be 
to uncover the client's image of himself and the antinomies 
at root of the conflicts, and either to operate within 
that metaphor-model-myth framework or provide alternative 
images to enhance meaning and possibilities for resolution. 
Any treatment can be effective if it stands within, and is 
coherent with, a metaphor-model-myth complex. It may be that 
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if clients were preselected on the basis of their image of 
man and matched to therapists and interventions, the statis-
tics of helpful interventions migh_t be significantly increased. 
Analyses similar to those completed above could be 
done for all other leading images of man. The metaphors 
whic~ men have used to understand man are rapidly being 
exhausted. They are limited by the rapid development of 
serious paradoxes. Psychology needs new metaphors, new 
explanations of t he NP, new images of man, to transcend its 
present state (Matson, 1976, p. 157). It seems. to me that 
the process of demystification, as difficult as this may be, 
is rather easy compared to the ne..xt step--creating new images. 
A new metaphor is necessary to resolve a true paradox. Then 
work is done to explicate the metaphor (~onstruct models), per-
fonn tasks of confirmation (empirical research), and amplifying 
and generalizing the metaphor (.developing myths). This tech-
nical development continues as long as it is productive and/ 
or until it begins to produce paradoxes again. I am in-
debted to Thomas Kuhn for this hypothesis (Kuhn, 1970). 
Psychologists must create new images of man, but they 
have no new images of man. The models examined here do not 
genuinely allow for creativity. This is the limiting paradox 
of present day psychology in attempting to resolve the neurotic 
paradox. 
To re ~ve the bind in the expression, explanation, and 
translation dimensions of meaning in interpretation, we need 
a model which includes not only the language, thought or 
action under consideration, but broader contexts which 
expressly allow for transcending deductions which are para-
doxical (self-referring}. 
The suggestion here is that psychologists ~eturn to the 
libe ral arts, t o think creatively out of a broadened reser-
voir of ideas. A free mind is one which is not "mystifle d11 
and is therefore able to destroy th.e limiting conditions 
of one's own metaphorical understanding. The creative mind 
playfully juxtaposes symbols. J.J. Gordon wrote: 
The element of playful impracticality 
is repeatedly emphasized in autobio-
graphical accounts of scientific dis-
covery and fit on a corollary to 
the double assertion that (a} language 
is essentially metaphoric and playful 
and only secondarily utilitarian; 
and (b} the child's grasp of language 
is initially playful and only later 
utilitarian. (_Gordon 1961, p. 114) 
Jerome Bruner agrees and chides teachers thusly: 
The shrewd guess, the fertile hypothesis, 
the courageous leap to a tentative con-
clusion--these are the most valuable 
coin of the thinker at work. But in 
most schools, guessing is heavily penal-
ized and is associated somehow with 
laziness. (Bruner, 1960, p. XX) 
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In closing, I 1-1ou1 d like to quote Michael Po1 anyi: 
"Any effort made to understand something must be sustained 
by the belief that there is something there that can be under-
stood." (.Polanyi, 1964, p. 45). I hope in this thesis 
there has been something to ent i ce the reader into believing 
there is something to be understood . 
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